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In chapter 1, I examine the consequences of a policy change in Rhode Is-
land that lowered the cap on payday loan fees (interest rates) from 15% of the
principal to 10%. I use a dierence-in-dierence framework and a unique pro-
prietary dataset of payday loan transactions to estimate the impact on market
outcomes. I nd that the lenders always charge the prevailing cap, creating a
strong rst stage. I also nd that demand for payday loans increases both at
the extensive and intensive margins. I show that debt cycles become longer and
more likely to end with default. Moreover, I nd that no lenders exit the market
after the policy change, implying that they had substantial market power. The
increase in aordability of the loans increases consumer surplus by about 44%.
Many consumer rights advocates believe that subprime consumers tend to be
time-inconsistent. With this assumption, welfare implications of a fee cap are
not straightforward, because the gain from higher aordability can be domi-
nated by the loss from amplied time-inconsistent behavior. To address this
issue, in chapter 2 I develop a dynamic model of payday loan usage with naïve
hyperbolic discounting. I calibrate the model in such a way that the simulated
means are as close as possible to empirical means for Rhode Island under both
regulation regimes (10% and 15% fees). Using simulations of the model, I show
that a tighter fee cap is welfare-improving for all consumers, regardless of their
degree of time-inconsistency. Furthermore, I nd that a ban is more benecial
than a fee cap to highly time-inconsistent consumers but harms time-consistent
consumers. In chapter 3, I examine whether earthquake risk salience increases
in an area in response to the news of earthquakes in other parts of the world.
Using 20 years of housing and earthquake data, I show that disastrous earth-
quakes happening in other parts of the world decrease home prices in high-risk
zip codes relative to low-risk zip codes. Moreover, I nd that higher casualties
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Payday loans attract substantial attention from the media and legislators who
criticize the payday-lending companies, mainly for charging high fees,1 and
trapping borrowers in debt cycles.2 Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB, 2016) reports that in 2015 there were more payday loan stores in the US
than McDonald's restaurants.3 An article by The New Yorker mentions that the
payday loan market accounts for nearly $40 billion dollars annually, and serves
more than nineteen million households a year (Taylor, 2016). When a consumer
takes out a payday loan, she has to repay it in one balloon payment, which is
usually a large portion of her income. When the due date arrives, she can pay
just the fee, and roll the loan over for another pay period. When a loan is rolled
over several times, it is said that the borrower is trapped in a debt cycle. This,
combined with the high fees, results in the borrower paying a large sum in inter-
est. For instance, if a person gets a bi-weekly $400 loan at a 15% fee, and rolls
1In the payday loan market, the interest and all other costs that the borrower has to pay
on top of the principal are referred to as fees.
2For a list of other criticisms of payday loans, see Montezemolo (2013).
3According to the report, the bureau estimates that there were 15,766 payday loan stores
in the US in 2015, compared to 14,350 McDonald's fast food outlets in 2014.
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the initial loan over for 7 periods, she would pay 0.15×$400×8 = $480 (or 120%
of the principal) in fees, during only 4 months. Therefore, there is concern that
the cost of the loans turn temporary nancial shortfalls into long-term crises.
(Bush, 2014)
To address the concerns with payday loans, many states have put regulations
in place, the most popular form of which are fee caps. Twenty six states have
fee caps that maintained the market, while seventeen others, plus the District
of Columbia, outright ban the loans, or impose fee caps that are eectively a
prohibition, as they have pushed all storefront lenders out of their respective
markets.4 In this paper, I investigate a regulation in Rhode Island that lowered
the cap on payday loan fees from 15% of the principal to 10%. Policy changes
similar to this were, and continue to be, considered by other states and the
federal government. For example, in April 2016, the Alabama Senate approved
a payday loan reform bill that would decrease the fee cap from 17% to 5%
(Lyman, 2016). Comparably, the US Congress introduced a new legislation to
cap payday loan fees in 2014, which did not pass (Layton, 2014). Therefore, it
is essential to understand how such policies impact consumers and their welfare.
In this paper, using a unique proprietary data-set of payday loans and a
dierence-in-dierence framework, I study a policy change in Rhode Island that
lowered the fees on payday loans from 15% to 10%, or equivalently, brought
the APR from approximately 390% down to 260%. The reduced-form results
indicate a strong rst stage, with the lenders always charging the prevailing cap.
This sharp price drop can be easily observed in a raw plot of the administrative
data. I nd the borrowers are price-sensitive both at the extensive and intensive
margin, as indicated by a 10% increase in the number of borrowers, a 5% increase
in the number of loans per borrower, and a 5% increase in average principal.
These changes combined, point to a 20% increase in borrowing as a result of
lowering the fees. I show that this impact unfolds immediately and persists over
time. These results are robust to the inclusion of macro-level controls, dierent
specications, choice of control group, and placebo tests.
Moreover, I show that no stores close after the new policy, suggesting that
market power exists in this market, and also implying that the quantity shifts
trace out the demand curve. 5 I also show that default at the individual
loan level occurs less often, possibly because the policy change makes defaults
4Prohibitive caps are frequently in the form of a 36% APR ceiling.
5Another assumption needed for this to be true is that the marginal cost of lenders has a
lower level than the fee caps. I argue later in section 6 that this assumption is reasonable.
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relatively more expensive than rolling over or paying o a loan. Additionally,
I nd that lowering the fees causes loan sequences to become 25% longer and
2.4 percentage points more likely to end with default. Finally, I nd that lower
fees do not attract a fundamentally dierent group of borrowers to the market,
as indicated by only negligible changes in average income and average age of
borrowers.
The economic literature on payday loans primarily revolves around papers
that study the impact of restricting access to payday loans on outcomes that
are indicative of nancial well-being, with mixed results. Some papers nd
adverse eects such as increase in Chapter 13 bankruptcy (Skiba and Tobacman,
2009), decrease in paying mortgage, rent and utility bills (Melzer, 2011), and
decrease in job readiness among military personnel (Carrell and Zinman, 2014).
Others observe favorable eects such as easier recovery from natural disasters
(Morse, 2011), or decrease in bounced checks (Morgan, Strain, and Seblani,
2012). A related paper is Zinman (2010) which investigates the eect of a
similar policy change in Oregon, and nds a negative eect of restricting the
market on employment and subjective (self-reported) nancial condition.
My paper is the rst economic study of payday loan fee caps in which no
attrition in the supply side ensued from the policy. This is an important distinc-
tion because it allows estimation of demand and consumer surplus. My study
is also the rst analysis in this market that uses large-scale administrative data
on payday borrowing, instead of survey data or small administrative data (for
a single lender). Furthermore, it is the rst academic paper that explicitly
takes into account the loan sequence phenomenon, the main channel through
which borrowers incur high interest costs. Finally, this paper provides the rst
estimates for price-elasticity of demand for payday loans.
Having the reduced-form results at hand, I examine how consumer welfare
is aected. Price ceilings are often seen as a way of increasing eciency when
market power is present. In the case of interest rates, caps can also be viewed as
a transfer from lenders, who have low marginal utility, to borrowers, who have
high marginal utility, and therefore act as a primitive means of social insurance
(Glaeser and Scheinkman, 1998). They also protect small and inexperienced
borrowers against exploitation (Blitz and Long, 1965).
If consumers are rational, lower prices almost certainly make consumers
better o. I argue below that the change in fee cap, accompanied with no lender
exits and low marginal cost, identies two points on the demand curve. Using
that demand curve, the change in consumer surplus is calculated to be about
3
+2.6 million dollars annually, or a 44% increase (assuming a linear demand
function). Furthermore, if we assume that loan losses (cost of default) are the
major contributor to the marginal cost of lenders, the change in producer surplus
is estimated to be about -1.6 million dollars annually, or a 26% decrease. Market
eciency (total surplus) increases by about 10%. The estimated demand and the
estimated marginal cost imply an unconstrained equilibrium fee of about 21%,
which is strictly consistent with what is actually charged by the same lenders
in states with no fee caps.6 This suggests that the demand and marginal cost
functions used in the analysis are reasonable.
These ndings are important to understand demand and supply in the pay-
day loan market, and to make informed regulatory decisions accordingly.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2, I introduce the
payday loan market and borrowing patterns in detail. In section 3, I describe
the data and provide summary statistics. In section 4, the research design is
laid out. In section 5, the reduced form results are presented. Section 6 contains
the analysis of demand and consumer surplus. Section 7 concludes.
1.2 Background
Payday loans evolved from what used to be called wage buying in the late 19th
century United States. To get a payday loan, the borrower walks into a payday
loan store and receives cash in return for a post-dated check in the amount of
the loan plus fees, dated on the borrower's next payday.7 The loan should be
repaid in only one payment, with no amortization. The duration of the loan
depends on how frequently the borrower receives her paycheck and therefore
can range from a few days to a month.8 If the borrower does not return on her
payday to repay the loan in cash and if the lender is unable to cash the check
(because of non-sucient funds, a closed account, etc.) default occurs.
Payday loans usually have a principal between $100 and $500. They are
easy to get in terms of location, requirements, and time. The stores often
establish themselves in places that are close to the impoverished, minorities,
and military personnel (Gallmeyer and Roberts, 2009). The application process
6For example, in Delaware, a state similar to Rhode Island in terms of region, size, and
population, but with no fee cap, the lenders charge 20% fees.
7The check is a back-up collection method. Lenders require in-person cash repayment in
most cases.
8Many states have placed a minimum on the duration of the loans. In Rhode Island, the
minimum is 13 days.
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is quick and easy. An identication document and proof of income are often
the only required paperwork. Some lenders do not perform any credit checks,
and the ones that do, query subprime credit bureaus9 and have lenient approval
thresholds. According to a lender's website, the application process requires
only 10-15 minutes.10
The interest and all other costs that the borrower has to pay on top of the
principal are referred to as fees. These fees depend only on the amount of the
loan and are independent of the duration of the loan or the borrower's history.
The fees range from 10% to 25% of the principal, with a national median around
15%. These fees translate into triple-digit APRs. For instance, a two-week loan
with a 15% fee has an APR of 390% (15% × 26 bi-weeks). The lenders argue
that these loans are designed to satisfy a one-time short-term emergency need
for cash (such as car repair, medical expenses, etc.), and APRs (which are
year-round) are an inappropriate measure of their expensiveness. Consumer
advocates respond that since the loans are often rolled over several times, the
borrowers actually incur the costs of high interest.
Although payday loans are designed to be repaid in one payment, if the
borrower is unable to do so when the loan is due, she can rollover the loan over
for another pay period, paying just the fee. To rollover a loan, the borrower does
not need to write a new check, unless the previous one is going stale. Quick
New Loans involve a similar procedure. A quick new loan is when the borrower
repays a loan, but takes out a new one before receiving his/her next paycheck
(For instance, when a borrower who gets paid bi-weekly gets a new loan in less
than 14 days after repaying the previous one). Using these two concepts, I
dene a loan sequence as an initial loan plus the series of subsequent rolled-over
or quick new loans. A sequence ends with either repayment (and no new loans
for at least one pay period) or default. I show below that in my data about 30%
of the sequences consist of only one loan, meaning that the borrower was able
to repay the loan the rst time it was due, and stay out of the market for at
least one pay period. On the other hand, 25% of the sequences include at least
10 loans. policymakers refer to such sequences as debt cycles and consider them
harmful to the nancial well-being of the households who are subject to them.
Overdraft protection (or courtesy pay) is believed to be the closest substitute
9These credit bureaus are dierent from prime credit bureaus such as Experian or Tran-




for a payday loan, because it does not require a collateral or a durable purchase
(Zinman, 2010). For each overdraft (even in small amounts) from the bank
account, a xed fee is charged by the bank. Currently, these fees average around
$30 per overdraft and are not subject to any price or usage regulations.
1.3 Data
I use a unique proprietary dataset held by a subprime credit bureau that contains
transaction level information on all loans issued by several major storefront
lenders from the beginning of 2009 to the end of 2013. The dataset contains
about 100 million loans (including rollovers) to about 5 million unique borrowers
in 36 states. For each transaction record, I observe lender information (lender
identier, and store zip-code), borrower information (borrower identier, age,
and monthly income), and loan terms (principal, fee, start date, due date, date
paid, and default indicator).11
The Rhode Island subset includes 742,602 loans and 23,576 unique borrowers.
To put these numbers into perspective, Rhode Island had a population of about
1 million people living in 400,000 households during the study. According to a
report by Experian in 2012, approximately 20% of Rhode Island residents were
subprime consumers,12 while the national average is 23%. The loans are issued
by monoline lenders with a total of 25 stores within the state. An inquiry to
the Rhode Island Department of Business Regulation revealed that there were a
total of 33 licensed payday loan stores in Rhode Island between 2009 and 2013.13
Assuming that each store gets the same share of the market, the dataset covers
over 75% of the store-front payday loan transactions in Rhode Island. The
location of all payday loan stores operating in Rhode Island between 2009 and
2013 is depicted in Figure 1.1a. Figure 1.1b depicts population densities in
Rhode Island. These two gures demonstrate that the stores are located in the
more densely populated areas of the state.
Table 1.1 shows summary statistics for the variables of interest in the Rhode
Island subset. The age of borrowers is distributed rather symmetrically, around
a median of 40 years. The median annual income of borrowers is about $22,600,
which slightly exceeds Rhode Island's ocial poverty line for a family of four in
11The dataset does not identify borrowers or lenders.
12Subprime consumers are classied as having an Experian VantageScore below 600.
13Earlier, I quoted a report from CFPB that there are more payday loan stores in the US
than McDonald's restaurants. Based on an online search, there are 32 active McDonald's
outlets in Rhode Island as of October 2016.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of Payday Loan Stores and Population within Rhode
Island
(a) Location of Payday Loan Stores (b) Population Density
The blue circles indicate all the 33 payday loan stores that operated in Rhode
Island between 2009 and 2013. No stores close during this timeframe, and only
two stores enter (which are shown here, but are not included in the sample).
The right graph shows the distribution of population in Rhode Island, with the
more densely populated areas colored in darker shades of red. Comparing the
two graphs shows that the stores are located in areas of the state where the
population is more concentrated.
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2010 ($22,000). Even after assuming that the borrower is not the sole breadwin-
ner in the household and another household member brings in the same amount
of money, the median payday loan user still makes less than the state median
household income of $56,000 in 2010. This supports anecdotal evidence that
payday loan users are predominantly low-income.
As mentioned before, loan sequences are a key feature of this market, from
a policy-making point of view. I apply the denition of a loan sequence to the
entire sample of Rhode Island loans, and obtain 81,189 sequences. The three
quartiles for the number of loans per sequence are 1, 3, and 10. I dene the
duration of a sequence as the number of days between the rst loan's initiation
and the last loan's due date. Since borrowers have dierent pay frequencies,
sequences with the same number of loans can have dierent durations. The
three quartiles for duration are 23, 60, and 174 days. Loan sequences can be
extremely long. The top 1% of the sample contain 69 or more loans, and last
for almost 4 years. The cost of borrowing in this market is sum of the fees paid
over the duration of the sequence (abstracting away from discount rates and
opportunity costs that are negligible in short periods). This cost is zero when
the borrower defaults after just one loan, paying no fees for the sequence. The
variable Total Fees per $100 in Sequence measures this cost, and has a mean of
$95, suggesting that, on average, the consumers pay $95 in fees for each $100 that
they borrow. Sequences which begin in the rst period might be continuations
of sequences beginning before the rst period. Similarly, sequences ending in the
nal period might have continued after the nal sample period. Therefore, the
numbers reported here (for number of loans per sequence, duration of sequences,
and total fees per $100 in sequence) underestimate the actual values.
Borrowers are not contractually barred from decreasing the principal with
each rollover, but in practice, they generally do not use this informal amorti-
zation mechanism. For about 83% of the sequences with at least two loans in
the sample, the last loan in the sequence has equal or higher principal than
the rst, conrming the lack of amortization in this market (also documented
by Burke, Lanning, Leary, and Wang (2014)). Lack of amortization goes hand
in hand with the rollover behavior because the borrower must either allocate a
large portion of her income to repay the loan, or less painfully, pay the fee and
roll the loan over. Payment-to-income ratio shows the portion of a borrower's
paycheck that should go toward repaying a payday loan. Since consumers who
are paid more frequently (e.g., weekly) receive less money with each paycheck,
this ratio is larger for them. The average and median are about 50%, which
8












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The data include about 750,000 loans issued by 2 lenders with 25 stores in
Rhode Island, and taken out by 23,000 unique borrowers, from the beginning of
2009 to the end of 2013. The statistics for Quarterly Personal Income and Monthly
Unemployment Rate are also for Rhode Island during the same timeframe, and are
obtained from BEA and BLS, respectively.
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demonstrate how dicult it is for a typical borrower to pay back their loan in
one payment.
About 2% of the individual loans in the sample are reported by the lenders
as defaulted. For comparison, according to S&P/Experian Consumer Credit
Default Indices, the default rates were 2.83% for bank cards and 1.03% for auto
loans in February 2014. However, if we consider loan sequences instead, about
17% end in default. From a lender's point of view, the default rate of individual
loans is more relevant because before each rollover, the lender receives the fee
for the current loan. Therefore each rolled-over loan is as protable as a new
loan issued to a new borrower.
In addition to the described dataset, I use state-level quarterly personal
income data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and state-level
monthly unemployment rate data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
These variables control for macroeconomic trends that could aect payday loan
usage in Rhode Island, beyond the change in fees.
1.4 Research Design
From 2005 to June 2010, Rhode Island law relating to nancial institutions (RI
Gen L  19-14.4) restricted payday loan licensees to the following practices:
 No licensee shall charge deferred deposit transaction fees in excess of fteen
percent (15%) of the amount of funds advanced.
 The maximum amount of a single customer's check (principal + fees) is
ve hundred dollars ($500).
 The maximum aggregate amount of concurrently outstanding checks held
by the licensee or its aliate from the same customer is ve hundred
dollars ($500).
 The maximum number of concurrently outstanding checks held by the
licensee or its aliates from the same customer is three (3).
 The maximum number of rollovers permitted is one.
In February 2010 a new bill was introduced in the Rhode Island House of Repre-
sentatives that lowered the cap on advanced fund fees from 15% to 10%, without
altering the other restrictions. This bill was enacted on June 25, 2010, and eec-
tive on July 1st. Hereafter, I refer to this updated law as the New Regulation,
10
Figure 1.2: First Stage
Each point represents the average fees charged by the lenders at each month.
The lenders always charge exactly 15% before the New Regulation, and 10%
right after it.
or NR. As depicted in Figure 1.2, the lenders perfectly complied with the new
regulation (they always charged 15% fees before NR, and 10% right after it),
and hence, a strong rst stage exists.
log(Yst) = α0+µs+φy(t)+γm(t)+λst+βXst+δ POST(t)+∆ POST(t) RI(s)+εst
(1.1)
In this equation, the level of observation is state (s) at month (t). Five years
of data are available, so t ranges from 1 to 60, and y(t), q(t) and m(t) represent
the year, quarter and month associated with each t. Since dierent states have
dierent market scales, I use log transformation and include state xed eects to
make the changes comparable. In addition to controlling for monthly and yearly
xed eects, I use a separate linear time trend for each state. In the next section,
I show that the results are not sensitive to alternative time specications, such
as year-month xed eects (i.e., having a xed eect for January 2009, instead of
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one xed eect for year 2009 and one for the month of January), or state-month
xed eects (i.e., seasonal trends that vary by state). Furthermore, I control
for state-level macroeconomic variables (Xst) that could aect the demand for
payday loans. Following Morse (2011), Xst includes quarterly personal income
(PIs,q(t)) (from BEA) and monthly unemployment rates (URs,m(t)) (from BLS)
for each state. POST(t) and RI(s) are, respectively, indicator functions for
whether the observation is post-NR (July 2010 and after, t ≥ 19), and for
whether the state is Rhode Island. Since the treatment starts in mid-2010, the
year xed eects do not perfectly align with POST(t) in equation (1.1). The
dierence-in-dierence parameter (∆) captures the causal eect of NR on Yst.
As in any dierence-in-dierence analysis, it is imperative to choose appro-
priate control groups. Aside from Rhode Island, loans from 35 other states are
available in the data-set. Out of these 35 states, 6 are available only partially
(1, 6, 20, 23, 37 and 39 months). Since the observations for these states fall en-
tirely or mostly on one side of the pre- or post- periods, I exclude them from the
analysis. From the remaining 29 states, I remove 11 states which went through
a policy change between 2009 and 2013 that could aect supply or demand for
payday loans.1415 From this point on, I refer to these 18 states as CG18.
To make the control group more homogeneous, I remove from CG18 all states
with no price cap (Idaho, Missouri, Nevada, South Dakota, Utah), or with high
caps that are barely binding (Louisiana, North Dakota, Texas, Wyoming)16.
This reduces the control group to Alabama, California, Florida, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska and Oklahoma, that I refer to as CG9. These states
either have a fee cap between 10% and 15% (of the principal or of the check),
or a step pricing scheme that starts with 15% for the rst $100, and goes down
a bit for the extra $100 increments of the principal.
Figure 1.3 depicts the evolution of variables of interest in Rhode Island in
contrast to CG9. While Rhode Island experiences a sharp drop in average fees,
the average fees stay almost at for CG9 states. The number of borrowers,
average principal, and total loan value (sum of principals) in Rhode Island show
a striking divergence from the states in CG9 after NR. The number of loans
per person and default rate are highly volatile and do not display changes as
14A list of payday lending legislations are made available by the National Conference of
State Legislatures at www.ncsl.org.
15None of these regulations are in the form of a clear-cut change in fee caps that can be
used with Rhode Island in the analysis.
16Lenders charge 18.5-22% in states with no fee caps. The eective cap in these four states
are in the same range.
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evident as the other variables mentioned.
It is important to note that the jump in average principal (and total loan
value) is partly a mechanical result of the law, rather than an economic response
to the lower fees (which is what I intend to study in this paper). The law
restricts the maximum amount of a customer's check, which is principal plus
fees, to $500. Therefore, when the fee is brought down, the lender can lend
up to a slightly higher amount. In practice, the principals do not exceed $435
when the fee is 15%, and $450 when the fee is 10%. Before NR, 43% of loans
were at the maximum amount, but this number rose to 55% when fees went
down. To capture only the portion of the change in principal that results from
borrowers' response to lower fees, I assume that every borrower in the pre-NR
period who got a $435 loan, would have taken out $450 if they could. With this
conservative adjustment,17 the increase in average principal (and consequently,
total principal) shrinks, but remains noticeable. Figure 1.4 compares average
principal before and after the adjustment. In the rest of the paper, I use the
adjusted version of average principal and total loan value.
In the next section, I estimate the change in several market outcomes using
the explained research design. Since CG9 includes states which have similar
regulation environments to that of Rhode Island, I consider it the main control
group; However, I show that the signicance and magnitude of the results do
not depend on the choice of the control group, although the estimates become
less precise with CG18.
1.5 Reduced Form Results
Estimation results for dierent outcomes of interest are presented in Tables 1.2-
1.5. As can be seen in the table, the results are not sensitive to the inclusion of
macro-level control variables, the choice of control group, or how seasonality and
time trends are controlled for. The standard errors are clustered at the state
level. Since the number of clusters are small (< 50), to determine statistical
signicance I follow Cameron and Miller (2015) in using student-t distribution
with G − L degrees of freedom, in which G is equal to the number of clusters
(states), and L is the number of cluster invariant variables. In case of equation
(1.1), in each cluster the constant and state identier are invariant, hence L = 2.
This results in larger critical values compared to those obtained by assuming
17Here conservative is meant that the borrowers could have chosen any amount between
$435 and $450, and adjusting to $450 leads to an underestimation of sensitivity to lower fees.
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Figure 1.3: Evolution of Dierent Variables in Rhode Island Vs. CG9
These graphs show how the variables of interest evolve dierently in RI com-
pared to the states in CG9 control group, after NR. CG9 includes states which
have similar payday loan regulations to that of Rhode Island, and which don't
go through any regulatory changes between 2009 and 2013. In all graphs, the
values for each state are log-transformed and subtracted from the value in June
2010, so that all states have the same origin before NR. The number of borrow-
ers, average principal, and total loan value show strikingly dierent behavior in
RI compared to the other states. Other variables are very volatile.
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Figure 1.4: Average Principal with and without Adjustment
The left graph shows the change in average principal without adjustment, and
the right graph shows the change with adjustment. The adjustment takes into
consideration that the maximum possible principal increased mechanically after
the fees went down, so that only the part of the change that is an economic
response to the lower fees remains. After the adjustment, the rise in average
principal shrinks, but remains noticeable.
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Table 1.2: Regression Results for Number of Borrowers and Number of Loans
per Borrower
Signicance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%)
Standard errors clustered at the state level.
Critical values are based on T(G - L) distribution (Cameron and Miller, 2013).
a normal distribution. For instance, when using CG9 as the control group,
signicance at the 95% level is determined by the t-statistic being larger than
2.36, instead of the usual 1.98.
The results show that lower fees lead to more people taking out loans (an
increase of about 10% in the number of borrowers), more frequently (an increase
of about 5% in the number of loans per person), and in higher amounts (an
increase of about 5% in average principal). These three variables all point to an
increase in payday loan usage. The main measure of payday loan usage is total
loan value (sum of principals), which shows an increase of about 20% when the
fees go down.18
The estimates show that default (among individual loans) occurs 12% less
often (which means decreasing from a base of 2% to 1.76%) as a result of the
18Since total loan value is equal to number of borrowers multiplied by number of loans per
borrower multiplied by average principal, this increase (20%) could be achieved by adding the
increase in each of those three variables.
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Table 1.3: Regression Results for Average Principal (Adjusted) and Total Loan
Value
Signicance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%)
Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Critical values are based on T(G - L) distribution (Cameron and Miller, 2013).
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Table 1.4: Regression Results for Average Default
Signicance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%)
Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Critical values are based on T(G - L) distribution (Cameron and Miller, 2013).
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Table 1.5: Regression Results for Characteristics of Borrowers
Signicance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%)
Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Critical values are based on T(G - L) distribution (Cameron and Miller, 2013).
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lower fees. This can be explained through two mechanisms. First, lower fees
make rollover and repayment relatively less costly than defaulting. Second, if
less credit-constrained consumers are attracted to the market when the fees go
down, and assuming that such consumers are less risky, the ratio of consumers
defaulting will also decrease. The slight increase in the average income of bor-
rowers (as seen in Table 1.5) supports this hypothesis.
All specications have high R-squares. This is because, rst, the payday loan
market has dierent scales across the states, and second, because the variables
have apparent seasonality. Therefore, the state and time xed eects alone
explain a big portion of the variation in outcomes.
In the next three subsections, I examine the robustness of the estimates to
placebo tests, use synthetic control, and show how the eects unfold over time.
Because total loan value and default rate are the outcomes that I use in welfare
analyses, the robustness checks focus on them.
1.5.1 Placebo Test
As a robustness check for the dierence-in-dierence analysis, I assume that the
policy change happened in any of the 9 states in CG9 plus Rhode Island, in any
period between 7 and 54. (I ignore the rst and last 6 months so that there
are enough pre- and post-periods.) I estimate the eect of each treatment
on payday loan consumption, using equation (1.1) and ordinary (non-clustered)
standard errors. This creates 480 (10 states × 48 periods) placebo estimates.
Figure 1.5 shows where the actual treatment (Rhode Island in period 19) falls
within the distribution of the t-stats. It turns out that the actual treatment
ranks 4th in absolute value of the t-statistic among all treatment eects, making
the probability of an impact this large happening by chance 0.8%. The three
larger t-stats also belong to Rhode Island around the time of the policy change.
Performing the same analysis for average default shows that the actual treat-
ment ranks 131st among 480 treatments (as depicted in Figure 1.6), in terms
of the absolute value of t-statistic, making it about 27% likely that NR did not
have an actual eect on default. For this reason, in section 6 when my analysis
involves default, I perform it both with a decreasing default and a at one, and
show that the results are only slightly aected.
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Figure 1.5: Distribution of Placebo Treatment Eects for Total Loan Value
The actual treatment (Rhode Island in period 19) is ranked 4th among 480 in
terms of absolute value of t-statistic, making the probability of a change in total
loan value this big happening by chance less than 1%.
Figure 1.6: Distribution of Placebo Treatment Eects for Average Default
The actual treatment (Rhode Island in period 19) is ranked 131st among 480
in terms of absolute value of t-statistic, making the probability of a change in
default this big happening by chance less about 27%.
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1.5.2 Synthetic Control Analysis
In this subsection, I follow the technique introduced by Abadie, Diamond, and
Hainmueller (2010) to construct a synthetic control for Rhode Island: a weighted
average of control units (states in CG18) that closely resembles pre-NR Rhode
Island. Subsequently, I study how the real Rhode Island diverges from its syn-
thetic version when the fee cap is lowered. I focus on only two outcomes, total
loan value and average default (both in log transformation). For each outcome,
the algorithm assigns weights to each state in such a way that the synthetic unit
tracks the pre-treatment treated unit (Rhode Island) as closely as possible. This
is achieved by nding the weights that minimize the Mean Squared Prediction






To make the synthetic unit even more similar to the treated group, weights
can be adjusted so that the synthetic and the treated units have similar pre-








for X ∈ Predictors
I choose the predictors to be Personal Income, and the ratio of subprime
individuals to the state's population.
I rst conduct the analysis for total loan value. Table 1.6 shows the weights
assigned by the algorithm to each state in CG18 to construct the synthetic
Rhode Island. North Dakota and Wyoming are the main contributors while the
other states receive weights below 10% each. These weights give the synthetic
unit equal pre-NR predictor means to those of Rhode Island. Figure 1.7 (A)
compares the time path of total loan value between RI and the synthetic unit,
while Figure 1.7 (B) displays the gap between the two paths.
To show that Rhode Island's divergence from its synthetic version after NR
is not a coincidence, a la Cunningham and Shah (2014), I make a synthetic unit
for all states in CG18. Next, for each state I nd the ratio of the post-NR MSPE
to the pre-NR MSPE. For a state that tracks its synthetic unit closely before
the treatment and greatly diverges from its synthetic unit after the treatment,
this ratio will be large. For a state that always remains close to its synthetic
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Table 1.6: Weights Used to Construct the Synthetic Rhode Island
State AL CA FL IA ID IN KS LA MI
Weight for Total Loan Value .029 .036 .028 .068 .051 .031 .045 .022 .042
Weight for Average Default .032 .034 .032 .046 .042 .033 .044 .028 .038
State MO ND NE NV OK SD TX UT WY
Weight for Total Loan Value .039 .199 .076 .015 .030 .084 .028 .057 0.122
Weight for Average Default .037 .299 .047 .024 .033 .049 .031 .044 .111
version, this ratio will be small. Figure 1.7 (C) shows the gap between each
state and its synthetic version. Rhode Island displays the biggest change after




states in CG18. RI has a ratio of 54.6 while the second largest ratio is 37. The
probability of RI having the largest ratio by chance is 1/19, or 5.26%.
I repeat the above analysis for average default. Table 1.6 shows the weights
given to states to make a synthetic unit that closely tracks pre-NR average de-
fault in Rhode Island. Figures 1.8 (a)-(b) compare the average default between
RI and its synthetic version. Finally, Figure 1.8 (c) shows the distribution of
post-MSPE to pre-MSPE ratios among the states. This ratio is 2.004 for RI,
which makes it the 12th largest one, implying a p-value of 0.63. This is consis-
tent with the result from the placebo test in which the eect of NR on default
was found statistically insignicant.
The results of the synthetic control analysis, in line with the placebo tests,
asserts that the increase in loan consumption is a consequence of the lower fees.
A strong statement cannot be made about the decrease in default.
1.5.3 Progression of the Eects
The progression and persistence of the eect of lower fees on payday loan usage
is important in regard to the welfare analysis. To measure these characteristics,
I estimate a variant of equation 1.1:
log(Yst) = α0 + µs + φy(t) + γm(t) + λst+ βXst + δPOST (t)+
41 POST1,6(t) RI(s)+42 POST7,18(t) RI(s)+43 POST19,30(t) RI(s)+44 POST31,42(t) RI(s)+εst
In this equation, POSTa,b(t) is equal to 1 for observations which are a to
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Figure 1.9: Evolution of the Eect on Total Loan Consumption
The gray band represents a 95% condence interval around the estimated eects.
The eect starts to show up immediately and persists over time.
b months after NR, and zero otherwise.19 Therefore, 41, . . . ,44 estimate the
eect of lowering the fees on total loan value, 6 months after NR (Jul-2010 to
Dec-2010), 7 to 18 months after NR (Jan-2011 to Dec-2011), 19 to 30 months
after NR (Jan-2012 to Dec-2012), and 31 to 42 months after NR (Jan-2013 to
Dec-2013), respectively.
Figure 1.9 displays the evolution of the eect over time. By the end of
2010, 6 months after NR, payday loan usage increases by about 15.7%. In the
subsequent years, the eect stabilizes at around 20%, although the further in
time we move, the less precise the estimates become.
1.5.4 Changes to Loan Sequences
Having learned that lower fees result in higher payday loan usage, it is interesting
to see how the structure of loan sequences are aected. In total, we have 60
months of data, of which 18 months belong to the pre- and 42 months belong to
the post-treatment period. This makes comparing the sequences before and after
the treatment challenging, because the post-treatment sequences are censored
from above at a higher level, and can be longer by construction. Since a sequence
could have started before period 1, and could have continued after period 60,
I remove the sequences that start in the rst month, and the ones that end
in the last month. As a result, the pre-NR sequences start and end between
19Please note that the POSTa,b(t) variables align perfectly with POST(t) and the yearly
xed eects. So there is no need to include them in the equation separately.
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Table 1.7: Eect of Lower Fees on Loan Sequence Structure
Signicance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%)
Standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Critical values are based on T(G - L) distribution (Cameron and Miller, 2013).
Each observation is a Loan Sequence.
periods 2 and 18 (or [2, 18]), which includes 17 months. To make the post-
NR sequences comparable to the pre-NR ones, I only keep the sequences that
start and end inside intervals of 17 months after NR, that is, the sequences
whose whole lifetime is inside time intervals [19, 35], [20, 36],... , [43, 59]. After
imposing this sample restriction, I use a regression equation similar to 1.1, but
at the sequence level (q), in which the subscript t refers to the time the sequence
started.
Yqst = α0 +µs +φy(t) +γm(t) +λst+βXst +δ POST(t)+∆ POST(t) RI(t)+εqst
(1.2)
In this equation, Yqst is a characteristic of the sequence q that started at
time t in state s. When the variable of interest is the log of the number of loans
in the sequence (Yqst = log(nq)), and when it is the log of the length (in days)
of the sequence (Yqst = log(dq)), the estimates show an increase of 25% and
20%, respectively, as presented in Table 1.7. This shows that lower fees make
sequences considerably longer.
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Figure 1.10: Eect of Lower Fees on Distribution of Number of Loans in Se-
quence
Each point is a dierence-in-dierence coecient obtained from estimating equa-
tion (1.2) with yqst = 1(nq > k), in which nq is the number of loans in sequence
q. Observations are sequences from Rhode Island and CG9. The bands repre-
sent a 95% condence interval. This graph shows that about 0.11 of probability
mass shifts from sequences with 6 or less loans, to sequences with more than 6
loans.
In addition to the average changes, it is important to see how the distribution
of loans per sequence changes. I dene Yqst = 1(nq > M) in equation 1.2, and
run a separate regression for M ranging from 1 to 30. Figure 1.10 shows the
estimation results for these regressions. This gure demonstrates that about
0.11 of probability mass shifts from the sequences with 1 to 6 loans to those
with 7 or more loans.
Longer sequences are an unintended consequence of the lower fees and can
negatively aect borrowers. For example, suppose that a borrower would rollover
a $400 loan 3 times when the fees are 15%20. This means that she would pay
a total of 4× ($400× 0.15) = $240 in fees. If she would rollover the same loan
5 times with 10% fees, she would pay 6× ($400× 0.1) = $240 in fees again. In
this imaginary case, the lower fees do not benet the individual. To see whether
borrowers pay more or less for a sequence after NR, I dene Yqst = nq × feet
in equation 1.2, in which feet is the prevailing fee at time t. The estimates,
20This constitutes a sequence of 4 loans, that is, the initial loan plus the following 3 loans.
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presented in the third column of Table 1.7, show that consumers pay about
8% less for each sequence. This number makes sense, because the fee for each
loan went from 15% to 10%, or a 33% decrease, while the number of loans per
sequence showed a 25% increase. The net eect on total sequence fees would be
8%. This is an interesting result, indicating that a big part of the decrease in
fees is canceled out by the longer sequences.
Finally, the results show that after the policy change, debt cycles become 2.4
percentage points more likely to end with default. This is interesting because I
showed before that default at the individual loan level (counting each rollover as
a separate loan) goes down. Imagine a scenario in which a borrower is subject to
a consumption shock each period, and defaults when she receives a large shock
while already in debt. In this case, the longer the debt cycle, the more likely is
the borrower to receive a large shock, and hence, to default.
1.5.5 The Online Market
In addition to the storefront payday loan market, there is an online market21
whose actual size is unknown, but according to a Pew Institute survey, is used
by one quarter of payday loan borrowers Bourke, Horowitz, and Roche (2012).
If the online market followed the same rules as the storefront market, I could
generalize my results to the whole payday loan industry. In reality, however,
pricing for online loans tends to not abide by state-sanctioned caps, because,
many online payday lenders claim to be exempt from state lending laws and
licensing requirements.22
I obtained a sample of online payday loans between 2010-2013 from a sub-
prime credit bureau. According to the bureau's estimate, this dataset covers
about 5-10% of the online market during that time frame. As seen in Figure
1.11, when the fee cap was 15%, online lenders charged Rhode Island residents
upwards of 20%. When the cap was lowered to 10%, the online fees were not
aected and kept an upward trend. As displayed in Figure 1.12, the number of
online loans also seems to be unaected by NR around the time of the change.
These graphs suggest that the online market is separate from the storefront mar-
ket, and that there is not a considerable substitution from the online market to
the storefront market when the fees go down. One possibility is that the online
21For an online payday loan, instead of a post-dated check, the borrower gives the lender
electronic access to their bank account.
22Such lenders identify as oshore or tribal.
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Figure 1.11: Online Payday Loan Fees for Rhode Island Borrowers
Many lenders in the online payday loan market identify as oshore/tribal, and
do not abide by the state laws (including fee caps). The fees are higher than the
storefront market, and do not seem to be aected by the imposition of lower fee
caps in mid-2010 (the vertical line).
market is used by borrowers who are excluded from the storefront market after
defaulting their loans.
1.6 Analysis of Demand and Surplus
With neoclassical agents, a decrease in price always increases consumer surplus.
To calculate this increase, I need an estimate of the market demand function.
In addition, to approximate the change in producer surplus (PS) and eciency
(total surplus), industry marginal cost (MC) is also required. The reduced form
results from the previous section, combined with a few assumptions that are
supported by the data, can be used to estimate these two functions.
In the previous section, I showed that the lenders charged 15% in fees when
the cap was 15%, implying that the fee would have been higher absent any cap.
Moreover, no stores leave the market at 10% fees, implying that the the rms
stay protable at this price. These two observations suggest that the lenders
had signicant market power.
To estimate the MC function, it is important to understand the costs the
lenders face. Flannery and Samolyk (2005) surveyed 600 stores (two monoline
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Figure 1.12: Number of Online Payday Loans Taken Out by Rhode Island
Residents
The number of online loans taken out by Rhode Island residents does not seem
to be aected around the time of the policy change (indicated by the vertical
line). There is a drop in the number of online loans in late 2012, but it is too
far in time to be attributed to the change in price cap in 2010.
lenders, and 300 stores each) within the US about their costs and revenues in
2002-2004. They summarize major operating costs for mature stores (in business
for more than 4 years) as seen in Table 1.8. By denition, MC is the cost to the
lender of making an additional $100 loan. Among the major costs of lenders,
loan losses (cost of default) seem to be more likely to be marginal, in the sense
that for each additional $100 loan, the loan loss is Pr(( default)) × $100 in
which Pr(( default)) can be thought of as the historic average default rate in
the market. Other costs such as wages and salaries, rent, maintenance, utility,
and taxes are less variant. For example, when the number of loans issued by
a store increases, unless they had been operating close to full capacity before,
there would be no need to hire new sta or to move to a bigger store. The other
category of the costs, loan collection expenses, is too small to have any economic
signicance. Assuming that loan losses are the major contributors to MC has
two implications: rst, since the default rate is around 2% in Rhode Island, the
level of MC (about 2$ per $100 loan) is much lower than the the level of price
caps ($10 per $100 loan). Second, as shown in the previous section, since the
default rate does not increase with the lower fees, neither does MC.
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Table 1.8: Main Operating Costs of a Payday Loan Store, Flannery and Samolyc
(2005)
Cost Type % Operating Costs
Wages and Salaries 39.80 (7.75)
Loan Losses 21.1 (9.6)
Rent, Maintenance, Utility and Taxes 17.3 (5.0)
Advertising 5.6 (3.7)
Loan Collection Expenses 1.3 (1.1)
Other Store Expenses 14.8 (5.2)
Total Costs 100
Flannery and Samolyc (2005) surveyed 600 payday loan stores pertaining to
their costs and revenues. This table summarizes their ndings on the main
operating costs of a payday loan store.
These two arguments (that the lenders have market power and the level of
MC is lower than the fee caps) suggest that the payday loan market setting
should resemble the one depicted in Figure 1.13. In such a market, if there were
no price caps, the lenders would set their price by setting marginal revenue
(MR) equal to MC. With a price cap P̄ , the lenders would choose their supply
(Q) by setting MC = P̄ . However, since the level of MC is lower than P̄
for all quantities, MC and P̄ never intersect, and the lenders supply as much




pairs, (Qp̄=15, 15) and
(Qp̄=10, 10) trace out the demand curve. The fact that no store left the market
when the cap was lowered to $10 indicates that at Qp̄=10, Average Total Cost
(ATC) remains below $10.
I set total (monthly) loan value when the fee is 15% to 4 million dollars
(Qp=15 = $4, 000, 000), which is the average predicted total loan value for Rhode
Island in each month between 2009 and 2013, assuming NR did not happen
(POST(t) = 0 in equation (1.1)). In section 3, I estimated the increase in total
loan value to be about 20% after NR, using various specications and control
groups. Hence, Qp=10 = 1.20 × Qp=15 = $4, 800, 000. With these two points
on the demand curve and assuming that demand is linear between them, it
is straightforward to calculate the change in consumer surplus. This change is
shown by the blue region in Figure (1.14) and is equal to4CS = $220, 000×12 =
2, 640, 000 dollars, annually. To estimate the increase in CS relative to the pre-
NR base, I have to impose an assumption on the shape of the demand curve for
Q ≤ Qp̄=10. Assuming linearity, this increase would be around 44%.
Although we do not know the exact marginal cost, but proceeding with the
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Figure 1.13: Market for Payday Loans
This gure depicts the market settings for payday loans in Rhode Island, based
on the reduced-form results. There is market power, so the unconstrained equi-
librium price would be higher than 15%. MC has a lower level than the fee caps,
so the quantity for each fee cap is determined by the market demand, not MC.
At 10% fees, ATC is lower than 10%, so no lender leaves the market.
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Figure 1.14: Change in Consumer Surplus
This graph depicts the increase in consumer surplus (the blue area) when the
fees go down. The relative increase in CS would be the blue area divided by the
yellow area.
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Delaware 20 20 20
Idaho 20 20 22
Missouri 19 19 19
Nevada 18.5 18.5 20
South Dakota 19 19 22
Utah 20 22 22
assumption that the cost of default represents MC, and that it stays at at 2%
after NR, the change in producer surplus is calculated to be4PS = −136, 000×
12 = −1, 632, 000 dollars, or a 26% decrease. Alternatively, consistent with the
regression results, I assume that MC is downward sloping for Q ≤ Qp̄=10. In
this case MC goes down from 2% to 1.76% when the fee changes from 15%
to 10%. The change in producer surplus is calculated to be -1,620,000 dollars
annually, or a 27% decrease. Therefore, whether we assume MC is at or slightly
downward sloping does not make much dierence about the change in PS.
The 44% increase in CS and the 26% decrease in PS combined result in an
8% increase in market eciency.
Even though assuming linear functional forms for demand and MC are sim-
plistic, there are two pieces of evidence that suggest that they provide reasonable
estimates of the actual functions. First, the linear demand function has an inter-
cept of 40%, which indicates the maximum willingness to pay for these loans in
the market. This number seems reasonable considering anecdotal evidence that
loan sharks, the alternative option for a desperate loan-seeker, charge about
40% for a two-week loan. Second, this linear demand and MC (no matter if
at or slightly downward-sloping) generate23 an unconstrained equilibrium fee
of about 21%, which is strictly consistent with the fees the lenders charge in
states with no fee caps, as presented in Table 1.9. Among states with no fee
caps, Delaware is the most similar to Rhode Island in terms of size, population
and region, and the lenders charge a 20% fee.
To see how sensitive the estimated changes in CS are to the linear assump-
tion, I repeat the analysis with two quadratic demand functions. To t a
quadratic function, 3 points are required but only 2 are identied by the change
23This is calculated by setting the marginal revenue derived from the demand function,
equal to MC.
35
Figure 1.15: Non-linear Demand Functions
(a) (b)
These graphs show the change in consumer surplus if the demand had a
quadratic form, and the maximum willingness to pay for payday loans was 30%
(the left graph) and 50% (the right graph). The dotted lines show the linear
demand for comparison. The absolute change in consumer surplus (the blue
part) is almost the same in both graphs, but the relative improvement (blue
area divided by the yellow area) depends on the demand shape, and is about
60% for the left graph and 30% for the right graph.
in fee cap. The linear function has an intercept of 40%. For the quadratic func-
tions, I assume an intercept of 30% (which creates an outward-curved function,
as shown in Figure (1.15) (a)), and 50% (which creates an inward curved func-
tion, as shown in Figure (1.15) (b)). With these functions, the increase in CS is
almost similar to the amount calculated with the linear demand ($2.6 million),
however, the relative change in CS is 62% and 34%, respectively. The implied
unconstrained equilibrium fees are 19% and 24%, respectively.
The calculations above are based on the assumption that the observed de-
mand function is the outcome of the borrowing decisions of neoclassical con-
sumers. If this assumption is not true, there are still things that can be learned
from this analysis. Violation of the neoclassical assumption makes the calcu-
lated 44% an upper bound for the actual improvement in CS. Looking at Figure
(1.16), we can break the increase in consumer surplus into two parts. The rst
part, colored in dark blue, shows that keeping the quantity xed at its initial
level (Qp=15 ), the borrowers would pay $2.4 million less annually for the same
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amount of loans. This is a direct transfer from the lenders to the borrowers and
would denitely make the consumers better o. The triangular part, colored
in light blue, represents the new borrowers and the increased borrowing by the
old borrowers, and amounts to $240,000 additional spending on payday loans
each year. This is the part that can potentially be welfare-decreasing if it is the
result of irrational (time-inconsistent) behavior. Since the size of the triangle
is 10% of the size of the rectangle, for the policy change to make consumers
better o, the welfare gain from one dollar transferred to the borrowers should
be at least one tenth of the welfare loss resulting from one extra dollar spent on
payday loans. Using the current analysis, there is no way of knowing whether
this is true or not. For this reason, in the next chapter I develop a theoretical
model of payday loan consumption, and simulate the eects of lowering the fees
on consumer welfare.
1.7 Conclusion
As payday loans remain an important concern to state and federal policy makers,
it is necessary for researchers to shed light on the consequences of dierent types
of regulation in this market. In this paper, I looked closely into an instance of
such regulations, namely, tightening the cap on payday loan fees. The legislation
decreased the fee cap on payday loans from 15% to 10% in Rhode Island in mid
2010. This legislation directly addressed one of the main concerns with payday
loans (high APRs)24 but not the rest of them, such as excessive rollovers that
result in debt traps. As shown in the paper, this policy change resulted in an
increase in the number of borrowers, the average amount of the loans, and the
length of loan sequences. If we assume that payday loans are like any other
good and that consumers are rational, lower prices undoubtedly lead to higher
consumer surplus. I calculated this increase to be about 44%. However, many
law-makers believe that payday loans are harmful products by nature, especially
since they target the subprime population who are less nancially educated and
more vulnerable to making decisions that are not optimal in the long-run. If
that is indeed the case, then we should take into consideration the potential
negative eects that can arise from the higher usage caused by the lower fees.
This would make the calculated eciency gains from the cheaper loans an upper
bound for actual welfare improvement.
24It should be noted that a $10 fee per $100 loan is still considered high by consumer rights
activists because it generates an APR above 36%.
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Figure 1.16: Decomposing the Change in Consumer Surplus
This graph shows the two components of the change in CS. The rectangular part
(in dark blue) represents a transfer from lenders to borrowers, and is denitely
welfare improving for consumers. The triangular part (in light blue) depicts the
additional spending on payday loans as a result of lowering the fees. If this is
a behavioral demand (in contrast with a neoclassical demand), the rectangular
section can potentially be welfare-decreasing if it is a result of over-borrowing.
The size of the triangle is one tenth of the rectangle.
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Chapter 2
Payday Loan Regulation with
Time-inconsistent Consumers:
Evidence from Rhode Island
2.1 Introduction
Many policy makers and consumer rights advocates believe that payday loans
are harmful to the nancial well-being of consumers. As a result, most US states
have imposed some form of restriction on lenders. As of 2017, interest rate caps
and payday loan prohibitions are the most widespread types of payday loan
regulation. If we assume that consumers are neoclassical (specically, time-
consistent or without present-bias), it follows that a tighter interest rate cap
certainly makes consumers better o by making the loans more aordable. This
assumption also implies that banning the loans is welfare-decreasing because it
makes consumers more credit constrained.
Payday loans are used largely by subprime consumers who are believed by
many policymakers to be more vulnerable to temptation, and to making de-
cisions that would hurt them in the long-run. This highlights the potential
importance of going beyond the neoclassical assumption to acquire a more com-
plete view of the welfare consequences of payday loan regulations. For this
reason, I perform a behavioral welfare analysis in this chapter, assuming that
the consumers can potentially have present bias and make time-inconsistent
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decisions. Such consumers tend to borrow even in the absence of bad (in-
come/consumption) shocks and to procrastinate on repaying the loans to keep
their current consumption high while disregarding future consequences. In this
case, lowering the fee cap can potentially be welfare-decreasing because it fur-
ther encourages time-inconsistent behavior. Similarly, a ban can be welfare-
improving because it protects consumers from overborrowing.
I develop a dynamic model of payday loan usage with naïve-hyperbolic dis-
counting, a la Skiba and Tobacman (2008), and calibrate it in such a way that
the simulated means are as close as possible to the empirical means in Rhode
Island, both when the fee cap was 15% and when it was 10%. The fact that the
model is calibrated to imitate the data under two dierent regimes (10% fees
and 15% fees) makes it more reliable than simple calibrations that are not iden-
tied o of a policy change. I nd that the behavior of the average payday loan
user in Rhode Island is consistent with a hyperbolic discount factor of about
0.6. Nonetheless, even accounting for this time-inconsistency, simulations of the
model imply that for all borrowers lower fees are welfare improving, suggesting
that the welfare gain from the lower cost of the loans outweighs the welfare loss
from the heightened time-inconsistent behavior. Simulations also suggest that
for the average consumer and those who are more time-inconsistent than aver-
age, removing the market (prohibiting payday loans) is more welfare improving
than lowering the fee cap to 10%, but the rest of consumers (those with lower
degrees of time-inconsistency) would be harmed by such a policy. In the end,
what type of regulation (between a fee cap and a ban) is preferred depends on
the weights assigned to consumers with and without present bias in the social
welfare function.
The economic literature on payday loans is mainly focused on how access
to the loans aects variables such as Chapter 13 bankruptcy (Skiba and To-
bacman, 2009), paying mortgage, rent and utility bills (Melzer, 2011), or home
foreclosures and property crime after natural disasters (Morse, 2011). There-
fore, the results of these papers can guide policymakers only when deciding to
prohibit the loans. My paper stands out in this literature because it compares
the welfare consequences of the two major forms of regulation (bans and fee
caps) within the same framework. The welfare analyses executed in this paper
are unique in the realm of payday loan research in the sense that, instead of
measuring the changes in variables that can be correlated with consumers' -
nancial well-being, I measure consumers' lifetime utility. For this reason, my
analyses provide a more holistic view of the welfare implications of a regulation.
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These results are important for the ongoing eorts to regulate consumer
credit markets, particularly when neoclassical assumptions are not likely to hold.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2, the theoretical
model is laid out. Section 3 includes model calibration. Simulation results and
welfare analyses are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Model
The model is built upon Skiba and Tobacman (2008) nding that naïve hyper-
bolic discounting is the most compatible with the behavior of payday borrowers
in their data1, compared to exponential discounting and sophisticated hyper-
bolic discounting. The model I develop is inherently similar to the one developed
by these authors, but in addition, is tailored for the institutional settings of the
Rhode Island market, and incorporates the discreteness of the choice between
re-paying, rolling over and defaulting a loan (instead of a continuous choice
about the change in the current loan balance).2
I develop the model only for a borrower who is paid bi-weekly or semi-
monthly, for two reasons. First, the median pay frequency and the median loan
duration are 14 days in the sample. Second, Skiba and Tobacman (2008) focus
only on bi-weekly loans as well. The details of the model and the parameter
values are laid out below.
The consumer's state in each period (St) is described by four variables:
the consumption shock (εt), wealth (or saving) (Wt), ever defaulted (Dt), and
payday loan balance (Lt).
St = (εt,Wt, Dt, Lt)
Every two weeks the person receives a xed expected income (Y ). I set
Y = $1100, because borrowers have a median monthly income of about $2200
in the sample. A bad consumption shock is a proportion of the income that
is consumed in the beginning of the period for unexpected/unplanned reasons
such as a car repair, medical bill, etc. A good shock can be interpreted as
an unplanned decrease in consumption or increase in income. A consumption
shock can have any value, even many times as large as the consumer's income.
1Payday loans from one lender in Texas issued during one year.
2This discreteness is a consequence of the lack of amortization in the payday loan market,
discussed in more detail in section 3.
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However, considering the small amount of payday loans (which cannot exceed
$500 in Rhode Island), these loans are not able to signicantly ease nancial
hardships after very large shocks. Because of this, as well as computational
reasons, I assume the shock can take 7 possible values. Large (good/bad) shocks
(with the size being 90% of the consumer's income), medium (good/bad) shocks
(60% of income), small (good/bad) shocks (30% of income) and no shock (0% of
income). I assume that the shocks are independent and identically distributed,
drawn each period from a symmetric distribution in which larger shocks are less
likely to realize. This distribution is more exible than parametric continuous
distributions such as normal or beta.
Yt = Y (1− εt)
εt ∈ {−0.9,−0.6,−0.3, 0,+0.3,+0.6,+0.9}
pε = (plg, pmd, psm, p0, psm, pmd, plg) , 0 ≤ plg ≤ pmd ≤ psm ≤ p0, 2plg+2pmd+2psm+p0 = 1
The consumer starts the rst period with an initial wealth of W1. I assume
that W1 has an exponential distribution with a mean of $500, consistent with
anecdotal evidence that subprime consumers live paycheck-to-paycheck and have
small savings.3 In the subsequent periods, the consumer starts with the savings
that were endogenously determined in the previous period. I assume that these
savings do not generate any interest as they are kept for short periods of time
(two weeks) as cash, or in a checking account. For computational reasons, I
assume that Wt ∈ [0, 2000].
Ever Defaulted (Dt) is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the person
has ever defaulted before, and zero otherwise. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that defaulting in the payday loan market results in future exclusion from the
product, although in practice exceptions occur. This means that whenever
Dt = 1, the consumer cannot borrow in the current or future periods (Lt+s =
0 for s ≥ 0). If the consumer has never defaulted before (Dt = 0) and starts
this period with zero balance (Lt = 0), she can borrow at the rate (r × 100)%
3Although I do not present the results, using a uniform distribution between [0, 2000] for
initial wealth has little bearing on the results.
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an amount of Lt+1 ∈ [Lmin, Lmax] = [100, 450].4
When the consumer starts a period with a non-zero loan balance (Lt > 0),
she will have three possible choices:
 First, she can repay the loan. In this case, she pays (1 + r)Lt and will
have no balance in the next period (Lt+1 = 0). She will be able to borrow
again in the future.
 Second, she can rollover the loan, and if she wants to and there is room to
do so, increase the balance by δt ∈ {0, [rLt, Lmax − Lt]}. In this case, she
just pays the fee (rLt) and carries the debt to the next period (Lt+1 =
Lt + δt). Note that the model does not allow decreasing the balance when
rolling over a loan, consistent with the lack of amortization in the market.
If the person decides to increase the balance, the increase should be at
least rLt, to justify the cost of writing a new check and other paperwork.
 Third, she can default. In that case she incurs a disutility of uD from the
stigma attached to defaulting a loan, and the annoyance caused by the
collection eorts of the lender, and all other pecuniary or non-pecuniary
costs of default, except the cost of exclusion from the market. The bor-
rower will start the next period with no balance (Lt+1 = 0), and the ever
defaulted variable switches to 1 (Dt+s = 1fors ≥ 1), meaning she cannot
use payday loans ever again.
Figure 2.1 displays this decision process as a owchart.
The instantaneous utility (the utility in each period, separate from the con-
tinuation payo) depends on the consumer's consumption in the period (ct) and
whether she defaults in that period (Dt = 0, Dt+1 = 1):
u(ct, Dt, Dt+1) = log(ct)− 1(Dt = 0 &Dt+1 = 1)uD
Notice that in the instantaneous utility function, UD is incurred only once,
in the period that the borrower defaults.
I assume that the consumer has naïve hyperbolic discounting. Each period,
such consumer thinks to herself Today I care mostly about today's consumption
(discount the future by βδ, β < δ), but beginning tomorrow I will be more
concerned about the future (discount the future by δ). However, when tomorrow
4The upper bound is consistent with the adjustment in principal explained in section 4.
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Figure 2.1: Payday Loan Consumer Decision-making Flowchart
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comes, she acts the same as today (discount future by βδ). Mathematically, this
means that the continuation payo has exponential discounting
V (ε,W,D,L) = max
c,W ′,D′,L′
{
u(c,D,D′) + δ E
ε′
V (ε′,W ′, D′, L′)
}
S.t. Budget Constraints (2.1)
However, the actual decisions in each period are made by solving
(c,W ′, D′, L′) = argmax
c,W ′,D′,L′
{
u(c,D,D′) + βδ E
ε′
V (ε′,W ′, D′, L′)
}
S.t. Budget Constraints (2.2)
In this model, δ is the exponential discount factor. I set this parameter equal
to δ = 0.99, as is the norm in models with this setting. The parameter β captures
the degree of time-inconsistency. A smaller β implies less emphasis on future
well-being, and more on instant gratication. This results in borrowing, even
in the absence of a consumption shock, to increase current consumption, and
to procrastinate on repaying the loan, to avoid reducing current consumption.
As an extreme case, when β = 0, the borrower does not solve an inter-temporal
problem anymore. When β = 1, the borrower becomes neoclassical. In the next
section, I nd that β = 0.6 best describes the behavior of the average borrower
in the data. This number is consistent with the hyperbolic discount factors
assumed or estimated in the economic literature. For example, Angeletos, Laib-
son, Repetto, Tobacman, and Weinberg (2001) set β = 0.7 and δ = 0.957 to
show how self-control problems inuence savings choices. Laibson (1998) also
calibrates β and δ to 0.6 and 0.99, respectively, to explain undersaving.
2.3 Model Calibration
Before using the model for welfare analysis, I pick values for all parameters of
the model. Above, I explained the rationale for the values I pick for the following
parameters:
 Bi-weekly income: Y = $1100
 Exponential (bi-weekly) discount factor: δ = 0.99 (which implies an an-
nual discount rate of about 0.8)
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 Mean of initial wealth distribution µ(W0) = $500
The free parameters include:
 Distribution of shocks pε = (plg, pmd, psm, p0)
 Disutility of default uD
 Hyperbolic discount factor β
The goal is to set the free parameters in a way that the simulated means (ȳi,s)
and the empirical means (ȳi,e) are close. I pick 8 means for this purpose: Aver-
age principal, ratio of consumers with positive loan balance to all consumers5,
number of loans per sequence, and average default, each for when the fee is 15%
and when it is 10%. The empirical means with 15% and 10% fees are calculated
by setting the POST variable in equation ((1.1)) equal to 0 and 1 respectively,
and nding the average of tted values for Rhode Island. The goodness of t
for a set of parameter values θ = (plg, pmd, psm, uD, β) , θ ∈ Θ, is measured in
the following way:
1. Given (plg, pmd, psm, uD) estimate the continuation payos by iterating
the bellman equation (2.1) until convergence is achieved. This should be
done once with the fee set to 15%, and another time with the fee set to
10%. By the end of this step, there are two continuation payo functions,
one for each fee. Note that β is not required for this step, because the
continuation payo has exponential discounting.
2. Given the continuation payo and the value of parameter β, simulate the
behavior of N consumers (N = 500) in T periods (T = 130 bi-weeks, or
5 years) using equation (2.2), separately for each fee.











The goal is to nd an optimal set of fee parameter values (θ∗) that minimizes
equation 2.3. Since re-evaluating MSE(θ) for each marginal change in a param-
eter requires solving two dynamic programming problems, plus the simulations,
5For the empirical value, all consumers refers to the 23,000 unique people who got a loan
at some point in the sample. For the simulated value, it refers to the number of consumers
used in the simulation (N=500)
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it is very time consuming to employ the family of Newton's optimization meth-
ods to nd θ∗. For this reason, I consider a plausible range for each parameter,
and use a grid search to nd the best combination. The grid for each parameter
is as follows (3600 possible combinations):
plg ∈ {0.01, 0.02, ..., 0.05}
pmd ∈ {0.06, 0.07, ..., 0.15}
psm ∈ {max(0.10, pmd), ..., 0.15}
uD ∈ {0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}
β ∈ {0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1}












(0.04, 0.11, 0.14, 0.4, 0.6). A probability of 0.04, 0.11, and 0.14 for a large,
medium, and small shocks implies that such shocks are likely to happen about
once, thrice, and 4 times per year, respectively. The estimated disutility of
default (0.4) means that the instantaneous eect of default on utility is ap-
proximately equivalent to that of having consumption in that period divided by
1.4.
Table 2.1 compares the simulated and the empirical means for these pa-
rameter values. The direction of change caused by lower fees is the same as
the reduced form results for all variables. The biases between the variables'
empirical and simulated means are also reasonably small.
I explained before how having dierent βs can result in dierent borrowing
behavior. In Table 2.2, I contrast the borrowing/saving behavior of consumers
with no saving or loan balance when the period begins. For this exercise, I keep
all parameters constant except for β which is moved from 0.2 to 1. As can be
seen in the gure, a neoclassical agent (β = 1) borrows only when she receives
a big or medium bad shock, and saves in other situations. In contrast, a very
time-inconsistent consumer, β = 0.2, borrows even when she receives a good
consumption shock. Similarly, Table 2.3 compares the behavior of consumers
with dierent βs, and similar otherwise, who start the period with a $450 loan
balance. Borrowers have similar default behavior, meaning that they default
only when they receive a large bad shock while they are already in debt. This
is a product of the disutility of default incorporated into the model, that
makes default undesirable. Rollover/repayment behavior is very dierent for
dierent βs, in the sense that neoclassical borrowers repay their loan as soon
as possible, and seldom rollover a loan. The most time-inconsistent borrowers,
always rollover their loans. The existence of extremely long sequences in the
empirical data (1% of the sequences in the sample have more than 69 loans)
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Table 2.1: Comparing Empirical and Simulated Means
Variable With Fee Empirical Mean Simulated Mean Bias = (E-S)
Principal 15% 365 338 27
Principal 10% 385 371 14
With Positive Loan Balance 15% 25% 33% -0.08
With Positive Loan Balance 10% 28% 40% -0.12
Default 15% 2% 2% 0.00
Default 10% 1.76% 1.5% 0.0024
Loans per Sequence 15% 4.1 3.8 0.3
Loans per Sequence 10% 5.1 4.8 0.3
The simulated means are obtained from simulations of the model with a pa-
rameter calibration that generates the smallest sum square error. The empirical
means with 15% and 10% fees are calculated by setting the POST variable in
equation ((1.1)) equal to 0 and 1 respectively, and nding the average of tted
values for Rhode Island. With Positive Loan Balance is the percentage of
consumers each month who have a positive loan balance. To make the pre- and
post-period sequences comparable, the number of loan in sequence is calculated
for intervals of 18 months (consistent with the reduced form analysis).
supports the idea that such borrowers indeed exist.
The simulations are repeated 5 times, each time for 500 consumers in 130
periods. In each repetition, the initial wealth of consumers, and the realization of
consumption shocks among consumers and periods change, while the underlying
distributions remains the same. Figures 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 display the simulated
average principal, loan per sequence, and average default for when the fees are
10% and 15%. While β = 0.6 matches the empirical data the best, other βs
are displayed for comparison. As can be seen, lower fees increase the principal,
make the sequences longer, and decrease default, which are all consistent with
the empirical results.
2.4 Welfare Analysis
Taking an ex ante lifetime welfare view, given the consumption path ({ct}Tt=0)
and default path ({Dt}T+1t=0 ) for a consumer, welfare (in T periods) is measured








Table 2.2: Eect of Time-inconsistency on Saving/Borrowing Behavior
This graph shows the saving/borrowing behavior of consumers with dierent
degrees of time-inconsistency (β) in response to dierent shock sizes. Note that
Yt = Y (1− εt), therefore a negative shock size indicates an increase in income.
These numbers are for a consumer with no saving and no loan balance, when
the payday loan fee is 15%. Positive numbers show saving, and negative
numbers show borrowing. The most time-inconsistent consumers (β = 0.2)
always borrow even when they receive a good shock. The neoclassical
borrowers (β = 1) borrow only when they receive large or medium bad shocks.
Table 2.3: Eect of Time-inconsistency on the Choice of De-
fault/Rollover/Repay
This graph shows the choice among default/rollover/repay for consumers with
dierent degrees of time-inconsistency (β) in response to dierent shock sizes.
Note that Yt = Y (1− εt), therefore a negative shock size indicates an increase
in income. These choices are for a borrower with no saving and a $450 payday
loan balance, when the payday loan fee is 15%. All borrowers default when
they receive a large bad shock. The most time-inconsistent borrowers
(β = 0.2) always rollover their loans, even when they receive a good shock,
because they want to avoid the drop in present consumption that follows
repaying a loan. The neoclassical borrowers (β = 1) repay their loan as soon
as they receive a good shock or no shock.
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Figure 2.2: Simulation Results for Average Principal
This graph compares average principal when the fee is 15% to when it is 10% for
the simulations of the dynamic payday loan usage model. When the fee is lower,
borrowers (regardless of the degree of time-inconsistency) borrow more money.
β = 0.6 is the most compatible with the average consumer in the empirical data.
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Figure 2.3: Simulation Results for Number of Loans per Sequence
This graph compares the number of loans per sequence when the fee is 15% to
when it is 10% for the simulations of the dynamic payday loan usage model.
When the fee is lower, the sequences become longer for time-inconsistent bor-
rowers. For the most time-inconsistent borrowers (β = 0.2) the sequences were
already so long that they could not get any longer when the fee goes down.
β = 0.6 is the most compatible with the average consumer in the empirical
data.
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Figure 2.4: Simulation Results for Average Default
This graph compares average default when the fee is 15% to when it is 10% for
the simulations of the dynamic payday loan usage model. When the fee is lower,
default decreases for all types of borrowers. . β = 0.6 is the most compatible
with the average consumer in the empirical data.
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Note that there is no β in this equation. In other words, everyone's welfare
is being measured by a rational consumer's criterion. This implicitly assumes ir-
rational consumers understand that rational behavior is optimal, but are unable
to commit to it.
Figure 2.5 shows the welfare improvement for decreasing the fee from 15% to
10%. The simulation shows that everyone, regardless of their β, benets from
the lower fees. The benet for those with high β (close to neoclassical behavior)
is small because they rarely use payday loans. The more time-inconsistent bor-
rowers benet the most from the lower fees. They show more time-inconsistent
behavior when the fees go down (they borrow more amounts and rollover more
often, as seen in Figures 2.2 and 2.3). On the other hand, they are paying less
for each loan. The second eect seems to dominate, and they are better o in
net.
I also examine the eect of removing the payday loan market. Figure 2.6
displays the welfare change caused by prohibiting payday loans compared to a
base case market with a fee of 10%. The results are in line with what we would
expect. The neoclassical consumers who use payday loans rationally would
be harmed by becoming credit-constrained. Time-inconsistent borrowers, on
the other hand, seem to benet from removing the market, implying that, for
them, the welfare loss from time-inconsistent behavior is larger than the welfare
loss from being more credit-constrained. The average consumer (with β = 0.6)
seems to fare better when the market is removed.
To conclude, it seems that the average (representative) borrower benets
from a lower fee cap, and even more from removing the market. But as we may
reasonably believe that consumers with dierent degrees of time-inconsistency
exist in the market, a tighter fee cap similar to the one studied in this paper
would benet all of them, whereas removing the market would harm one group
(the neoclassical consumers) and benet the others. Which policy is superior,
therefore, depends on policymakers' preferences regarding the social groups they
intend to protect. As in any other theoretical model, the caveat is that these
results are only as reliable as the underlying assumptions of the model, especially
the main one, that consumers have hyperbolic discounting.
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Figure 2.5: Welfare Improvement for Lowering the Fee Cap (Simulation Result)
This graph shows the average welfare improvement caused by bringing the fee
cap down from 15% to 10%, calculated from simulations of the dynamic payday
loan usage model. The band represents two standard deviations above and two
standard deviations below the average improvement. Consumers with dier-
ent degrees of time-inconsistency benet from the lower fees. The more time-
inconsistent borrowers benet slightly because they rarely use payday loans.
The most chronic users (those with low β) benet the most. β = 0.6 is the most
compatible with the average consumer in the empirical data.
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Figure 2.6: Welfare Improvement for Removing the Payday Loan Market (Sim-
ulation Result)
This graph shows the average welfare improvement, calculated from simulations
of the dynamic payday loan usage model, caused by removing the payday loan
market compared to a base case market with a fee of 10%. The band represents
two standard deviations above and two standard deviations below the average
improvement. The average borrower (β = 0.6) and the more time-inconsistent
borrowers benet from removing the market, while the more time-consistent
borrowers are harmed from losing access to a source of credit.
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2.5 Conclusion
One approach to measuring welfare, while taking the negative eects of payday
loans into account, is to assume that the borrowers have present-bias, which
leads to their borrowing more, and procrastinating more on repaying the loans,
to keep their current consumption high. Lower fees would encourage this be-
havior and could lead to welfare decreases. I developed a model of payday
loan usage in which consumers have naïve-hyperbolic discounting. I tailored
the model to imitate the institutional settings of payday loans in Rhode Is-
land, and calibrated the parameters so that the simulated means are close to
the empirical ones. Simulations of this model showed that even when taking
the time-inconsistent behavior into account, consumers would be better o with
lower fees because the increase in time-inconsistent behavior is not large enough
to dominate the utility gains from the lower cost of usage. Simulations also
show that removing the market, compared to tightening the fee caps, is even
more welfare improving for the average borrower (who is time-inconsistent), but
would harm the time-consistent borrowers. If we accept that consumers with
dierent degrees of time-inconsistency exist in the market, a tighter fee cap
would benet all of them (although at dierent levels), whereas removing the
market would hurt one group (the more time-consistent consumers) and benet
the others. The preferable policy, therefore, depends on the weight that poli-








The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the salience of natural disasters
in a housing market is aected by the occurrence of out-of-the-market natural
disasters. In hedonic pricing models, the value of a house is determined by its
own characteristics (such as age, square footage, and number of bedrooms), as
well as those of its environment (such as proximity to good schools and air qual-
ity). Another factor in the latter category is vulnerability to natural disasters
like earthquakes and hurricanes. For example, Brookshire et al. (1985) demon-
strate that in California, information on earthquake hazards that were made
available by a 1974 state law created a market for safe housing that previously
did not exist. Each person has a perception about the likelihood of an earth-
quake hitting the area in which they live, own, or intend to buy. This perception
is primarily based on objective information, such as seismic hazard maps pub-
lished by scientic and government authorities; but it can also be subject to
psychological biases.
In this paper, I investigate the existence of one form of such biases, namely,
panicking after learning the news of a disastrous earthquake outside of the mar-
57
ket, and subsequently increasing the salience (or subjective probability) of earth-
quakes in the market. The idea is that the news of an earthquake accentuates
the potential damages and casualties such incidents can cause. It reminds in-
dividuals that the danger may be closer than it seemed, thereby making them
panic and leading them to re-assess their own risks. In psychology literature,
this phenomenon is referred to as aective reactions. Slovic and Weber (2002)
explain
One of the ways in which the aective processing of a potentially
dangerous situation is of value is as a signal that some action needs
to be taken to reduce the diagnosed risk. The feeling of fear, dread,
or uneasiness will serve as salient and potent reminder to take such
action and should remain in place until such action is completed and
the impending danger ag can be removed.
This need to take action can manifest itself in the housing market in the form
of a higher willingness to sell and a lower willingness to buy high-risk homes.
This would lead to a transfer of extra bargaining power from the sellers of high-
risk homes to the buyers, resulting in lower prices for such homes. I compare
home prices between low- and high-hazard zip codes in California, before and
after catastrophic earthquakes that take place in other parts of the world. A
signicant but temporary decrease in prices of high-hazard zip codes after a
distant earthquake can be taken as evidence of such bias.
California is a particularly suitable place to test this hypothesis because
state laws emphasize availability and transparency of information regarding
earthquake hazard. Specically, two provisions in Alquist Priolo Act serve this
purpose in the housing market:
 The law directs the California Geological Survey agency to compile de-
tailed maps of the surface traces of known active faults. These maps
include both the best known location where faults cut the surface and a
buer zone around the known trace(s);
 The law requires property owners (or their real estate agents) to formally
and legally disclose that their property lies within the zones dened on
those maps before selling the property.
Earthquakes with higher damages and casualties are expected to induce a larger
bias for two reasons. First, they receive more extensive press coverage, making
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the news known to more individuals. Second, the more disastrous an event,
the more profound the impact on the public's psyche. Moreover, we expect
the subjective probability to return to its long-run equilibrium once the mental
images of death and destruction fade into the background.
In this paper, I nd that earthquakes in other parts of the world indeed aect
home prices in California (measured by Zillow's Home Value Index (ZHVI) and
Zillow's median listing price). According to the easiest-to-interpret specication,
after a catastrophic earthquake (with more than 1000 casualties), ZHVI and
median listing price fall by about 6% and 3% respectively in high-risk zip codes
(with a Peak Ground Acceleration of 0.65 or greater) relative to low-risk zip
codes (with a PGA of less than 0.18). To put this number into perspective,
Black (1999) shows that all else equal, having an additional room adds about
3% to the value of a house. Additionally, I nd that the eect on prices is
transient and disappears after one month. Finally, I show that higher casualties
lead to larger price decreases.
A similar paper to this is McCoy and Walsh (2014) which investigates the
eect of wildres on risk perceptions. They nd that for properties located fur-
ther than 5 km from a re (but in the same county) and without a view of a
wildre burn scar, housing values in high-risk zones, relative to housing values
in low-risk zones, incur a loss in the range of 6% - 9% in the year immediately
following a wildre. They also show that the price eects become statistically
insignicant after two years. Another paper in this spirit is Naoi et al. (2009),
that shows the price discount from locating within a quakeprone area is signif-
icantly larger soon after earthquake events (in Japan) than beforehand. These
two papers look at the eect of events on areas not directly aected by the
events, but still within the same county or country, while my paper looks at
global events. My paper is most closely related to Boes et al. (2015) in that it
studies out-of-market/non-local impacts. Boes et al. nd that rents near nu-
clear power plants in Switzerland decreased by 2.3% after the Fukushima nuclear
power incident, implying that individuals increased their subjective probability
of nuclear plant incidents. My paper is unique because while Boes et al. focus
on a single incident, I use all signicant earthquakes that occurred around the
world over a twenty year period. Furthermore, my paper allows the eect on
home prices to be commensurate with the number of casualties, which gives us
further insight into how salience evolves.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I describe the
data. In section 3, I lay out the research design. In section 4, I present and
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discuss the results. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Data
I combine three datasets for this analysis:
 Seismic Hazard (Earthquake potential damages) data from United States
Geological Survey (USGS), 1996
 Records of signicant earthquakes from National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), 1997-2016
 Monthly zip-code level home price indices from Zillow, 1997-2016
In what follows, I explain each dataset in detail.
3.2.1 Seismic Hazard Data (USGS)
This dataset contains Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) that can happen with a
probability of 10% in the next 50 years for each geographical coordinate (latitude
and longitude, rounded to the closest rst decimal). PGA is the maximum
ground acceleration that occurs during earthquake shaking at a location. The
unit of PGA in the data is g (g being the gravitational acceleration). So a PGA
of 1 means ground acceleration would be equal to the gravitational acceleration.
According to USGS, higher PGAs are directly linked to higher damages, with
a PGA of 0.65 and above being expected to cause heavy or very heavy damage
(Group, 2001).
I use another dataset that includes zip code boundaries in California, and
match each zip code to a PGA, based on its centroid coordinates. Figure 3.1
shows the PGA for zip codes in California, in which darker shades of red repre-
sent higher PGA, and therefore, heavier potential damages.
3.2.2 Records of Signicant Earthquakes (NOAA)
According to NOAA1, a signicant earthquake meet at least one of the following
criteria: approximately $1 million or more in damages, 10 or more deaths, has
a magnitude of 7.5 or greater, a modied Mercalli Intensity X or greater, or the
earthquake generated a tsunami. With this denition, there are 1042 signicant
1https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/struts/form?t=101650&s=1&d=1
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Figure 3.1: PGA for California zip codes
61
earthquakes from the beginning of 1997 to the end of 2016 (20 years), 13 of
which occurred in California. This means that at least one signicant earthquake
happened every month during these twenty years. I use the number of casualties
as a proxy for press coverage and for the depth of an earthquake's impact on
public psyche. As for earthquakes that happen in California (13 of them in
the data), I control for them separately regardless of the number of casualties,
because experiencing a ground shake can aect one's salience, even if no damage
is incurred.
3.2.3 Home Prices (Zillow)
Zillow provides dierent home value indices. The most granular one, the Zillow
Home Value Index (ZHVI) is available monthly at the zip code level, and goes
back twenty years. To create this index, Zillow receives home sales data from
counties and other municipalities. Then it uses those data in an algorithm to
create an estimate (Zestimate) for the value of all homes within a zip code in a
month. ZHVI is the median value of zestimates in each zip code. Because this
index is constructed taking into account all homes for which Zillow has data
rather than only those that are sold, the changes in values are less sensitive to
selective home sales (Sanders, 2014).
In addition to ZHVI, I use Median List Price per sq. ft. which is equal to
the raw median of home prices (per square foot) listed on Zillow for sale. This
variable is available only for 2010 on.
While home price data is monthly, earthquakes can happen on any day
within the month. Therefore, if an earthquake occurred in the second half of
the month (day > 15) I assign it to the next month, before merging the price
data and earthquake data.
3.3 Research Design
To test the hypothesis that earthquake salience increases in a market in re-
sponse to out-of-the-market earthquakes, I examine whether home prices fall in
earthquake-prone zip codes after a signicant earthquake happens in any other
part of the world. To capture this eect, I use a dierence-in-dierence frame-
work, which basically compares home values between high- and low-hazard zip
codes, and between the aftermath of an earthquake and other months (no earth-
quake or small casualties). Figure 3.2 illustrates this identication strategy.
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Figure 3.2: Identication Strategy illustrated (Does not display actual data.)





α ·PGAz ·CACasualtiest +
∑
k
ak ·PGAz ·CACasualtiest−k + γz +λt + εzt
(3.1)
The outcome of interest is home price in zip code z at time (month) t, as
measured by ZHVI, or listing price per sq ft. The coecient of interest is β which
measures the dierential eect of a non-California quake between high-hazard
and low-hazard zip codes. Zip Code xed eects (γz) capture all time-invariant
characteristics of each zip code, while time xed eects (λt) control for state-
wide shocks in each period. Furthermore, I separately control for earthquakes
happening in California, to avoid confounding the eect of global earthquakes.
The model includes lags to test whether the price eects last over time.
However, we do not expect the eect to be long lasting. Lobb et al. (2012) show
that after the Haiti earthquake in 2012, related Twitter posts, press releases,
newspaper stories, and charitable donations peaked one week after the event,
and almost disappeared less than a month after the earthquake. As individuals
forget about the event within a month, the eects on salience are also likely
to decay within the same time frame. Furthermore, as a robustness check, I
estimate another variant of equation 3.1 that includes leads along with the lags.
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This practice is to insure the results are indeed driven by the earthquakes, not
by anticipation thereof which is impossible.
I will estimate variants of equation 3.1 in which I use a categorical variable
(low, medium, and high hazard) instead of a continuous measure of PGA, be-
cause it is conceivable that most individuals do not know the exact measure
of seismic hazard in their area, but have a rough idea about its level. I also
use a dummy variable for the extent of casualties (high casualty, as dened by
having a death count of above 1000 and low casualty otherwise). This practice
is mainly to achieve coecients that are easier to interpret.
3.4 Results
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the results for estimating equation 3.1 with ZHVI
and median listing price as the outcome of interest, respectively. Specication
(I) includes no lags or leads. Specication (II) includes two lags, which turn
out to be insignicant at the 5% level. (I also tried higher lags with similar
results, not reported in the paper.) In specication (III), I also include leads
as a falsication test. In all specications, and for both outcomes, the same-
period eect is signicant at the 1% level. This implies that earthquakes outside
California can asymmetrically aect home prices in California, based on whether
the home is known to be in a high hazard area or not. The results also show
that the higher an earthquake's casualties, the larger the asymmetry.
It is worth mentioning that Zillow's algorithm for creating ZHVI may smooth
out the sharp movements of prices, and hence make the coecients in table 3.1
an underestimation of the actual eects. For this reason, the results for median
list price (which is a raw measure) may provide a more accurate measure of the
price eects.
In table 3.3, I transform continuous measures into categorical ones, to make
the results easier to interpret. I control for California earthquakes using a
dummy variable (1 if an earthquake happened in California in a given period,
and 0 otherwise), instead of the number of casualties (which are always less
than 3 for California earthquakes in the data). I cannot do the same for non-
California earthquakes because they occur so often almost every period would
be agged as having an earthquake. Therefore, I set a threshold of 1000 ca-
sualties for a non-California earthquake to count as impactful. There are 20
of such earthquakes between 1997 and 2016. Moreover, instead of using PGA
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as a continuous measure of seismic hazard, I dene a low-hazard zip code as
having a PGA of 0.18 or lower, a medium hazard zip code as having a PGA be-
tween 0.18 and 0.65, and a high hazard zip code as having a PGA of more than
0.65 (in accordance to Group (2001)). The results show that a high-casualty
earthquake can cause ZHVI and median asking price to drop by about 5% and
2% in medium-risk zip codes (relative to low-risk zip codes), and by about 6%
and 3% in high-risk zip codes (relative to low-risk zip codes). These eects are
approximately equivalent to the eect of having 1.5 additional rooms in a house
(all else unchanged).
In all of these regressions, the lags are statistically insignicant at the 5%
level, implying that the adjustments in subjective probability are temporary
and do not extend beyond one month after the earthquake. In addition, all
coecients on leads turn out statistically insignicant at the 5% level in all
regressions, providing evidence that the results are not spurious.
The earthquakes that happened in California could have aected home prices
directly by causing damage to buildings and infrastructure. Since in this paper I
am solely interested in the eect of salience, I exclude zip codes within a 10-mile
radius of the center of the earthquakes from the sample. The removed zip codes
are marked in gure 3.3. Table 3.4 compares the results for estimating equation
1 with the unrestricted sample (all zip codes) and the restricted sample (zip
codes not directly aected by earthquakes). Consistent with what we expect,
the eect of California earthquakes on prices shrinks slightly when using the
restricted sample.
3.5 Conclusion
Based on hedonic pricing models, we expect the price of a house to reect its
environmental characteristics, including vulnerability to natural disasters. In
this paper, I examine whether earthquake risk salience increases in an area in
response to the news of earthquakes in other parts of the world. The change
in salience can also be thought of as an adjustment in individuals' subjective
probability of an earthquake occurring in their area. To test this hypothesis, I
use a dierence-in-dierence framework to see if earthquakes happening in other
parts of world aect home prices in quake-prone zip codes in California. I show
that a catastrophic out-of-California earthquake decreases prices (as measured
by the Zillow home price index, and median listing price per sq ft) in earthquake-
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Table 3.1: Regression Results for ZHVI
Signicance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%)
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Table 3.2: Regression Results for Median Listing Price
Signicance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%)
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Table 3.3: Regression results with categorized PGA and casualties
Signicance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%)
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Figure 3.3: Earthquakes in California, 1997-2016
Each dot represents the center of an earthquake that occurred in California,
1997-2016. The shaded areas are zip codes within a 10 mile radius from the
center of the earthquake.
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Table 3.4: Regression results for zip codes not directly aected by earthquakes
Signicance levels: *** (1%), ** (5%), * (10%)
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prone zip codes by about 6%, relative to the least quake-prone zip codes. The
eect decays after one month. I also show that the higher the casualties of an
earthquake, the larger the eect on prices.
In psychology, the change in salience in response to events that do not di-
rectly aect a person are called aective reaction. Aective reaction involves
taking actions to avoid the negative impacts of a possible undesirable event. In
the housing market, this translates into trying to sell a vulnerable house or to
avoid buying such a house. Therefore, we would expect a drop in the prices of
homes that are located in high-hazard areas. The analysis in this paper adds to
the existing evidence supporting the existence of this phenomenon. The obser-
vation that the price eect decays after a month is also interesting, and could
suggest that the adjustment in salience is not rational. In this sense, this
paper captures the market-level manifestation of a psychological bias overruling
rational decision-making. On the other hand, one can think of a scenario in
which someone owning a vulnerable building in a high-risk area has been pro-
crastinating on selling the house but does so after feeling panicked by a distant
earthquake. In this case, the reaction is rational and corrects a behavioral bias.
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